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RACE, RHETORIC, AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS:  
MISSOURI AS A CASE STUDY 
BRAD DESNOYER* & ANNE ALEXANDER+† 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 9, 2015, the president of the University of Missouri 
System resigned after “months of escalating racial tension surrounding 
high-profile incidents on the flagship campus.”1  The resignation and events 
preceding it, including a graduate student’s hunger strike and a threatened 
boycott by the University of Missouri’s football team,2 prompted local, 
state, and national debates on race and higher education. 
On one hand, some media outlets reported that “angry black students” 
caused “[c]haos”3 and “targeted” innocent students.4  In this narrative, 
commentators portrayed students as throwing “tantrum[s]” and wishing to 
be “coddl[ed]”5 in an “imaginary civil-rights triumph.”6  The University 
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 1.  Elahe Izadi, The Incidents That Led to the University of Missouri President’s Resigna-
tion, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-
point/wp/2015/11/09/the-incidents-that-led-to-the-university-of-missouri-presidents-resignation/. 
 2.  Douglas Belkin & Melissa Korn, University of Missouri System President Tim Wolfe Re-
signs, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2015, 8:18 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/university-of-missouri-
system-president-tim-wolfe-resigns-1447086505. 
 3.  Megyn Kelly, The Kelly File, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Nov. 11, 2015, 10:46 PM), 
http://mediamatters.org/video/2015/11/11/foxs-megyn-kelly-calls-protesters-in-missouri-
a/206806; see also Chaos on Campus: Students Protest, Call for Heads to Roll at Schools Around 
Country, FOX NEWS (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/11/12/university-
missouri-does-not-accept-professor-resignation-over-email-flap.html.  
 4.  Jillian Kay Melchior, Mizzou Records Show Students Feared Violence and Felt Targeted 
by Protesters, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 20, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/ 
434260/mizzous-protesters-frightened-many-campus.  
 5.  Kathleen Parker, Column: Let’s Hope for Another Tantrum—Over Our Coddling Cul-
ture, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 25, 2015, 3:27 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/com 
mentary/ct-college-protests-microaggressions-missouri-yale-dartmouth-amherst-perspec-112-
20151125-story.html.  
 6.  Daniel J. Flynn, Sports Page Becomes Op-Ed Section in Wake of Missouri Football Pro-
tests, BREITBART (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/sports/2015/11/11/sports-page-
becomes-op-ed-section-in-wake-of-missouri-football-protests/.  
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was depicted as a community “gripped” by “fear” due to the acts of Afri-
can-American students.7 
In contrast, other media outlets reported that African-American stu-
dents protested with “anti-racism demonstrations”8 after “racist incidents” 
occurred at a campus with a long history of racial “injustice.”9  In this coun-
ter-narrative, students were battling “systemic racism,”10 and the football 
team’s boycott “influence[d] broader campus issues.”11  Opinion pieces 
“applaud[ed]”12 the students’ “ability to effect change”13 in a “hostile envi-
ronment[]”14 and articulated that “racial threats” by white students “against 
[b]lack students” escalated,15 leading to a “[c]risis” where black students 
were afraid for their safety.16 
These competing narratives are more than mere media constructs; they 
are reflected in all of society, where “majoritarian narratives”17 dominate 
the landscape with their themes and rhetoric.18  And while the rhetoric of 
                                                          
 7.  Jillian Kay Melchior, Emails Show How Fear Gripped Mizzou Amid Racial Tensions, 
FOX NEWS (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/04/20/emails-show-how-fear-
gripped-mizzou-amid-racial-tensions.html.  
 8.  Madison Pauly & Becca Andrews, Campus Protests Are Spreading Like Wildfire, 
MOTHER JONES (Nov. 19, 2015, 1:52 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015 
/11/missouri-student-protests-racism.  
 9.  Jaeah Lee, Uncovering the Painful Truth About Racism on Campus, MOTHER JONES 
(Nov. 20, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/11/racism-campus-
protests-mizzou-yale-craig-wilder.   
 10.  Pauly & Andrews, supra note 8. 
 11.  Travis Waldron, How the Mizzou Protests Demonstrate the Power of College Athletes, 
HUFF. POST (Nov. 10, 2015, 11:23 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/missouri-protests-
college-athletes_us_5641fde6e4b0411d3072713d.  
 12.  Andre M. Perry, Campus Racism Makes Minority Students Likelier to Drop Out of Col-
lege. Mizzou Students Had to Act., WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/11/11/campus-racism-makes-minority-
students-likelier-to-drop-out-of-college/?utm_term=.b40f9d75c10a.  
 13.  Adam Howard, Conservative Backlash to Mizzou Protests May Backfire, MSNBC (Nov. 
13, 2015, 12:33 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/conservative-backlash-mizzou-protests-may-
backfire.  
 14.  Perry, supra note 12. 
 15.  Gerren Keith Gaynor, Racial Threats Against Black Students Heighten on Mizzou Cam-
pus, CENTRIC (Nov. 11, 2015, 12:30 PM), http://www.centrictv.com/news-views/centric-
news/articles/2015/11/11/racial-threats-against-black-students-heighten-on-mizzou-
campus.html?fb_comment_id=903319916410651_903459853063324#f2f9dae35d8ce9c.   
 16.  Allison McGevna, Crisis at #Mizzou: Suspects Arrested for Threats That Left Black Stu-
dents Fearing for Their Lives, HELLO BEAUTIFUL, http://hellobeautiful.com/2015/11/11/mizzou-
racist-threats-lockdown/ (last updated Nov. 11, 2015, 8:44 AM). 
 17.  See infra Part I for an explanation of majoritarian narratives. 
 18.  See Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Racial Realism: A Comment on White Optimism and 
Black Despair, 24 CONN. L. REV. 527, 530 (1992); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in 
School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665, 666 (1993) (referring to majoritari-
an “stories” as a tool used to keep outsider voices from being valued) [hereinafter Delgado, On 
Telling Stories]; see also Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond the Models and 
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race evolved over the twentieth century, the ubiquity of majoritarian narra-
tives undermined any true change of the story.19 
Missouri serves as an illustrative backdrop for discussing these narra-
tives.  Missouri was admitted into the Union as a slave state, as a “compro-
mise,”20 and even today, Missouri serves as a microcosm of America and 
American compromise.  Social and political debates have found their stage 
in Missouri,21 from campus protests22 to controversial school transfers,23 
from Dred Scott24 to Ferguson,25 and from segregated housing26 to public 
housing failures.27  As the New York Times observed, “Depending on your 
                                                          
Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 425–31 (2000) (discussing how narratives 
shape the realities of and divides between African Americans and whites).   
 19.  See generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION 29 (2d ed. 2012) (“[T]he breakthrough [of landmark cases like Brown] is quietly 
cut back by narrow interpretation, administrative obstruction, or delay.  In the end, the minority 
group is left little better than it was before, if not worse.”). 
 20.  See Primary Documents in American History: Missouri Compromise, LIBRARY OF 
CONG., https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Missouri.html (last updated Nov. 16, 2015).  
See generally ROBERT PIERCE FORBES, THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE AND ITS AFTERMATH: 
SLAVERY AND THE MEANING OF AMERICA (2007).  
 21.  JOHN DOMBRINK & DANIEL HILLYARD, SIN NO MORE: FROM ABORTION TO STEM 
CELLS, UNDERSTANDING CRIME, LAW, AND MORALITY IN AMERICA 187 (2007) (“Missouri was 
known as a bellwether state, where many of America’s policies were debated.  It had a mix of ur-
ban and rural residents, a racial mix (although without many Latinos or Asians), blue-collar and 
white-collar workers, significant Catholic and evangelical populations, and good colleges and uni-
versities.”).  
 22.  Izadi, supra note 1.  
 23.  Nikole Hannah-Jones, This American Life, The Problem We All Live With (Part I) (This 
American Life radio broadcast July 31, 2015), https://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-
archives/episode/562/the-problem-we-all-live-with.   
 24.  In the mid-nineteenth century, St. Louis was the backdrop to Dred and Harriet Scott’s 
freedom suit, in which they briefly won at a retrial in 1850—at the very St. Louis courthouse that 
contradictorily hosted slave auctions.  See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE, ETHNICITY AND SOCIETY 
418 (Richard T. Schaefer ed. 2008) (noting the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), “energized abolitionists, intensified the conflict between the northern 
and southern states, and is thus widely considered to be the first shot in the Civil War”); see also 
JOHN A. WRIGHT, DISCOVERING AFRICAN AMERICAN ST. LOUIS: A GUIDE TO HISTORIC SITES 9 
(2d ed. 2002); Tim O’Neil, Look Back 250: Slavery Was a Fact of Life in St. Louis from the Be-
ginning, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 17, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-
and-politics/look-back-slavery-was-a-fact-of-life-in-st/article_aec80774-80a2-52e9-b0e9-
7a0c5522c66c.html.  The Missouri Supreme Court later sat to overturn the jury’s decision grant-
ing the Scotts’ freedom, writing, “As to the consequences of slavery, they are much more hurtful 
to the master than the slave.  There is no comparison between the slave in the United States and 
the cruel, uncivilized negro in Africa.”  Scott, A Man of Color v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576, 587 
(1852).  
 25.  For a broad overview of the events of Ferguson, Missouri, see S. David Mitchell, Fergu-
son: Footnote or Transformative Event, 80 MO. L. REV. 943, 950–52 (2015).  
 26.  See Rigel C. Oliveri, Setting the Stage for Ferguson: Housing Discrimination and Segre-
gation in St. Louis, 80 MO. L. REV. 1053, 1055–65 (2015) (discussing several historic fair housing 
cases stemming from segregationist housing practices).  
 27.  Katharine G. Bristol, The Pruitt-Igoe Myth, 44 J. ARCHITECTURAL ED. 163, 163 (1991).  
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perspective, Missouri is either the southernmost northern state . . . or the 
northernmost southern state . . . .”28  
Using Missouri-based judicial opinions, this Essay demonstrates the 
influence of majoritarian narratives and how evolving rhetoric perpetuated 
stagnant narratives.  In other words, these opinions, when viewed in histori-
cal context, demonstrate how the “status quo narrative” continued in society 
even after the law changed.  This Essay examines opinions centered on both 
the legal and de facto segregation of African Americans and whites in three 
landmark cases: State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,29 Kraemer v. Shelley,30 and 
Liddell v. Board of Education.31 
In 1937, the Missouri Supreme Court reasoned, in State ex rel. Gaines 
v. Canada, that the State’s segregationist education public policy extended 
to prohibiting African-American students from attending the University of 
Missouri.32  The United States Supreme Court reversed Gaines33 and began 
the legal erosion of “separate but equal” in higher education, setting the 
stage for Brown v. Board of Education.34  In response to the Gaines rever-
sal, Missouri adopted legislation to maintain its status quo.35  It was not un-
til 1950, eleven years later, that the University admitted its first African-
American students.36 
A decade later, in Kraemer v. Shelley, the Missouri Supreme Court en-
forced a racially restrictive housing covenant, articulating that the contrac-
tual rights of white homeowners outweighed the equal protection rights of 
African Americans.37  The United States Supreme Court reversed Kraem-
er,38 sparking activism and the creation of the fair housing movement.  
                                                          
 28.  Micah Cohen, In Missouri’s Move to the Right, A Question of How Far, N.Y. TIMES: 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 21, 2012, 1:28 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/ 
21/in-missouris-move-to-the-right-a-question-of-how-far/.  
 29.  113 S.W.2d 783 (Mo. 1937) (en banc), rev’d, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
 30.  198 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. 1946) (en banc), rev’d, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 31.  469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1979), rev’d sub nom. Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 
1277 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 32.  See 113 S.W.2d at 785–87. 
 33.  See Gaines, 305 U.S. 337. 
 34.  347 U.S. 438 (1954); Andrew Kull, Post-Plessy, Pre-Brown: “Logical Exactness” in 
Enforcing Equal Rights, 24 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 155, 158 (1999) (positing that the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gaines “shows that Plessy v. Ferguson was no longer persuasive to a majority 
of the Court as a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 35.  State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 131 S.W.2d 217, 218–19 (Mo. 1939) (en banc) (citing 
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 9618, 9622 (1929)). 
 36.  On Campus: Recent Campus Changes, MO. ALUMNUS, Oct 1950, at 5, 5.  
 37.  198 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Mo. 1946) (en banc), rev’d, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).  
 38.  See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 23. 
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Housing discrimination continued, however, and St. Louis remains one of 
the nation’s most segregated cities.39 
In 1979, in Liddell v. Board of Education,40 a Missouri federal district 
court held that the judiciary could not remedy segregation in St. Louis 
schools because there was no proof of intentional segregation by the school 
board.41  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed 
and remanded,42 and St. Louis’s city and suburban school districts entered 
into the “nation’s largest and longest-running school desegregation pro-
gram.”43  After years of increased integration, however, the program saw 
steep decline in participation when court supervision of the program ended 
in 1999.44  Since 2000, the St. Louis Public School District has struggled to 
maintain its State accreditation.45 
Part I of this Essay gives a brief overview of majoritarian narratives 
and minority counter-narratives, the scholarship of Critical Race Theory, 
and the judiciary’s rhetoric in race-based cases.  Part II analyzes the narra-
tives and language of Gaines, Kraemer, and Liddell, provides the social 
context of these cases, and traces their historical outcomes.  The Essay then 
concludes that long-lasting societal change has been elusive because with-
out explicitly rebutting majoritarian narratives and giving voice to counter-
narratives, even progressive judicial opinions cannot effectively challenge 
the status quo. 
I.  RACIAL NARRATIVES AND JUDICIAL RHETORIC 
Rhetorical analysis of judicial opinions identifies narratives in the law, 
the language of the law, and the law’s impact on society.  This approach 
recognizes that the law itself is a “negotiated construct[], coproduced by 
                                                          
 39.  CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE 
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES 223–25 (1959); Carol Rose, Property Stories: Shelley v. Kraem-
er, in PROPERTY STORIES 188, 219 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009); 
Oliveri, supra note 26, at 1053.  
 40.  Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1304, 1362–64 (E.D. Mo. 1979), rev’d sub nom. 
Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 41.  Liddell, 469 F. Supp. at 1362–64.  
 42.  Adams, 620 F.2d 1277. 
 43.  Elisa Crouch, St. Louis Desegregation Program Headed for Phase Out, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (June 10, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/st-louis-desegregation-
program-headed-for-phase-out/article_9dadfa4c-3d49-5b80-b6ec-2b1c03d2e5c7.html.  
 44.  Id.; Kristen Taketa, Voluntary Deseg Program to Close for New Students in 2024, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/voluntary 
-deseg-program-to-close-for-new-students-in/article_8a8a0b54-c88c-532f-af8e-
8cebfe7fd487.html. 
 45.  Jessica Bock & Elisa Crouch, Superintendents Ask State for Accreditation Upgrade, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/superin 
tendents-ask-state-for-accreditation-upgrade/article_d893de1b-9283-503b-b69a-
03c27d097f96.html.  
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rhetors and their audiences.”46  It begins by asking, “[W]hat voices does the 
law allow to be heard[;] what relations does it establish among them?  With 
what voice, or voices, does the law itself speak?”47 
Among their dynamic and significant work, scholars of Critical Race 
Theory apply rhetorical analysis to the intersection of race and the law,48 
revealing how majoritarian narratives inform the law and perpetuate sys-
temic discrimination.49  The disparity in experiences50 between African 
Americans and whites regarding socio-economic and political issues51 
amounts to more than differences in “personally-held viewpoints.”52  Ra-
ther, this disparity is reflective of what scholars call “different cultural ‘nar-
ratives’”—narratives that form cultural communities and individual reali-
ties.53 
Legal opinions, however, rarely reflect the existence of differing narra-
tives, because the law is written in the form and voice of the majority,54 
which in defining itself, creates its meaning and perpetuates the dominant 
law.55  “Empowered groups long ago established a host of . . . narratives,” 
and many people today hear these narratives as certainties, or as ingrained 
convictions about “merit, causation, blame, responsibility, and racial jus-
tice.”56  The “majoritarian faith” therefore lauds dominant stories as rhetori-
cal myth and memory or, in other words, as “truth.”57  Moreover, as these 
                                                          
 46.  MAROUF HASIAN JR., LEGAL MEMORIES AND AMNESIAS IN AMERICA’S RHETORICAL 
CULTURE 1 (2000). 
 47.  James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Commu-
nal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 697 (1985).  
 48.  See, e.g., Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381 (1989).  
 49.  See also Ifill, supra note 18, at 441.  See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE 
CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 3d ed. 2013). 
 50.  DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 19, at 47 (“People of different races have radically 
different experiences as they go through life.”). 
 51.  Ifill, supra note 18, at 424, 439.  Ifill cited to several polls and studies revealing differing 
perspectives between African Americans and whites on issues related to race, such as the “mean-
ing and power of discrimination,” to “ostensibly nonracial issues” such as taxes, and to the exist-
ence of racial bias in the criminal justice system.  Id. at 424–25.   
 52.  Id. at 439.  
 53.  Id.; Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Seri-
ous Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1957 (1991).  
 54.  The very language of the law is anathema to the counter-narrative, preferring legalese and 
vague precepts to vivid and empathetic stories about people.  See Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Le-
gal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2101, 
2106, 2123 (1989) (discussing potential use of empathy in judicial opinions); see also ANNE 
STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL: HOW OUR LEGAL SYSTEM BETRAYS US 58–63 (1996) (citing FRED 
RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS! 127 (1957) (criticizing legal language as inaccessible)).  
 55.  THOMAS ROSS, JUST STORIES: HOW THE LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAS 12 (1996); 
see STRICK, supra note 54, at 15. 
 56.  Delgado, On Telling Stories, supra note 18, at 666. 
 57.  Id. at 670–71.  Rhetorical myths are “[e]nduring narratives” that might transcend cultures 
based on shared values.  HASIAN JR., supra note 46, at 15.  Rhetorical memories “influence the 
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narratives are adopted by courts and become dominant law, they are im-
posed on all of society, including minority communities and minority com-
munity members.58  In this way, majoritarian narratives can reflect “status 
quo narratives,” which perpetuate centuries-long subjugation of minority 
voices and a segregated nation. 
Within these majoritarian narratives exist problematic themes that 
maintain the majoritarian faith as truth.  These themes provide an internal 
continuity, allowing readers to incorporate future experiences back into 
dominant stories without reflecting on the validity or value of the status 
quo.  Professor Thomas Ross has identified the themes of “black abstrac-
tion” and “white innocence,”59 and Professors Richard Delgado and Jean 
Stefancic have analyzed the theme of “imposition.”60  In the theme of black 
abstraction, courts “refus[e] to depict blacks in any real and vividly drawn 
social context” or provide a complete picture of the experiences of African 
Americans within majoritarian narratives.61  African-American actors are 
merely secondary characters within a story that is not their own, with judi-
cial rhetoric “obscur[ing] the humanness of black persons.”62 
White innocence refers to “the insistence on the innocence or absence 
of responsibility of the contemporary white person.”63  This theme pre-
sumes that white people should not be punished for societal inequality 
                                                          
way entire generations selectively think about the relationship between the past, present, and fu-
ture.”  Id.; see also STRICK, supra note 54, at 144 (“[T]he most pernicious bias consists in believ-
ing oneself to have none.”); Richard Delgado, Making Pets: Social Workers, “Problem Groups,” 
and the Role of the SPCA—Getting a Little More Precise About Racialized Narratives, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 1571, 1580 (1999) [hereinafter Delgado, Making Pets]. 
 58.  Ifill, supra note 18, at 439–40; see IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 81–86 (2006) (analyzing law’s coercive function and contribution in 
creating and perpetuating racial classifications). 
 59.  See Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstrac-
tion, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1990) [hereinafter Ross, Rhetorical Tapestry].  See gener-
ally Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1990).   
 60.  See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Imposition, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1025 
(1994). 
 61.  Ross, Rhetorical Tapestry, supra note 59, at 2.  Ross further articulates: “Rhetoric is a 
magical thing.  It transforms things into their opposites.  Difficult choices become obvious.  
Change becomes continuity.  Real human suffering vanishes as we conjure up the specter of right-
eousness.  Rhetoric becomes the smooth veneer to the cracked surface of the real and hard choices 
in law.”  Id.  Aristotle wrote, “First, then, one should grasp that on whatever subject there is need 
to speak or reason it is necessary to have the facts belonging to that subject . . . either all or some 
of them; for if you had none, you would have nothing from which to draw a conclusion.”  
ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIL DISCOURSE 169 (George A. Kennedy trans., 2d 
ed. 2007).  
 62.  Ross, Rhetorical Tapestry, supra note 59, at 6.  
 63.  Id. at 3.  
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through affirmative action or race-based judicial remedies.64  White inno-
cence also suggests a lack of collective responsibility for present-day ine-
quality, and that discussion of white privilege is either hidden by abstract 
language or omitted entirely.  This silence coincides with the privilege 
white people carry to dismiss the very concept of “whiteness” and instead 
adopt the view that their perception is truly colorblind neutrality, a mirror of 
the nation’s long-held “values, perspectives, and ideals.”65 
Similar to how black abstraction and white innocence assume a white 
world by default, the theme of imposition depicts an “outsider” or “reform-
er” as a “nuisance,”66 or as “one who is overstepping, is abusing his or her 
welcome, or is going too far.”67  Thus, by seeking equal rights and affirma-
tive action, African Americans are presented as agitators, hostile to white 
innocence.68   
Specifically, there are four ways courts present the tale of outsider im-
position to discredit the outsider’s argument: impugning the outsider per-
sonally,69 impugning the outsider’s motives,70 impugning the outsider’s ac-
tions,71 or characterizing the reform sought as leading to outrageous 
results.72  To use these themes effectively, courts use persuasive writing 
techniques.73  The rhetorical language of the law is, after all, persuasion.74  
                                                          
 64.  ROSS, supra note 55, at 27–28; see also BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT NOW I 
SEE: WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS & THE LAW 78 (1998) (“[W]hite people tend to view intent as 
an essential element of racial harm; nonwhites do not.”). 
 65.  Ifill, supra note 18, at 423–24. 
 66.  See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 60, at 1029; see also BEVERLY TATUM, “WHY ARE 
ALL THE BLACK KIDS SITTING TOGETHER IN THE CAFETERIA?”: AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS 
ABOUT RACE 26 (1997) (“To the extent that members of targeted groups do push societal limits—
achieving unexpected success, protesting injustice, being ‘uppity’—by their actions they call the 
whole system into question.”). 
 67.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 60, at 1029. 
 68.  Id. at 1036–37 (looking specifically at the plurality opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), which implied “the backers of the Richmond program, which 
would have increased the number of minority contractors, were themselves racially hostile and 
were prepared to be unfair to innocent whites”). 
 69.  Id. at 1030 (“Sometimes courts and others deem an individual guilty of imposing by vir-
tue of who he or she is—that is, simply by being a Jew, woman, Chinese, or black, engaged in 
some ordinary activity of life.”).  
 70.  Id. at 1036.  Delgado and Stefancic argue that, from the perspective of the courts, “[t]he 
outsider is not looking for social justice, but spoiling for a fight, with a chip on his or her shoulder.  
Or the outsider has an impermissible motive—advancing social claims to win funding, acclaim, or 
power he or she does not deserve.”  Id.   
 71.  Id. at 1039 (“[T]hey hold that the reformer is doing something wrong—either demanding 
something that by its very nature constitutes imposition, or going about things the wrong way, 
e.g., by trying to vault to the head of the line.”). 
 72.  Id. at 1043 (observing that courts invoke reductio ad absurdum and the “where would 
you draw the line?” arguments most often in law reform cases). 
 73.  See generally Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Ju-
dicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1995) (stating that judges write opinions to “rein-
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Historically, judicial opinions explicitly used race-based rhetoric.75  But, as 
the rhetoric of race evolved in the twentieth century, the explicit rhetoric 
was replaced with either hollow facts obfuscating important racial context 
or wholesale omission of any explicit discussion regarding the history or 
reality of systemic racial discrimination.76 
In many cases, explicit race-based rhetoric was replaced by the use of 
enthymemes.77  Enthymemes are a form of argument where a conclusion is 
reached without stating the underlying assumption on which it is based.78  
Because the reader already presumes the truth underlying the reasoning and 
is actively engaged in using their own assumptions to understand the speak-
er, the speaker’s argument becomes all the more persuasive.79  Judicial use 
of enthymemes allows courts to presume the reader will accept the unstated 
premise based on the reader’s incorporation of the problematic themes and 
ingrained narratives.  Majoritarian enthymemes are particularly disconcert-
ing because of their elusiveness; the minor premises perpetuate without be-
ing articulated. 
Indeed, judicial language dealing with race often “masquerad[es]” as 
being built upon “neutral principles,”80 but in fact, it has historically contin-
                                                          
force our oft-challenged and arguably shaky authority” and “justify our power to decide matters 
important to our fellow citizens”). 
 74.  Lawrence Douglas, Constitutional Discourse and its Discontents: An Essay on the Rheto-
ric of Judicial Review, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 225, 226 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns 
eds., 1996). 
 75.  In The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstraction, Professor 
Thomas Ross analyzes the explicit race-based rhetoric permitting black subjugation in Dred Scott 
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), the rhetoric of “black abstraction” and “white innocence” in the 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and the rhetoric of a black “self-imposed stigma” in Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 573 (1896), before discussing twentieth century opinions.  Ross, Rhetorical 
Tapestry, supra note 59, at 9–19. 
 76.  Cf. Ross, Rhetorical Tapestry, supra note 59, at 20–34 (analyzing the rhetoric of Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981), and 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).  
 77.  For more on Aristotle, enthymemes, and legal rhetoric, see Steven D. Jamar, Aristotle 
Teaches Persuasion: The Psychic Connection, 8 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 61 (2002). 
 78.  See JAMES J. MURPHY ET AL., A SYNOPTIC HISTORY OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC 68–70 
(4th ed. 2014); see also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC AND COMPOSITION: COMMUNICATION 
FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE INFORMATION AGE 223 (Theresa Enos ed., 1996) (“Although vari-
ously used in history, enthymeme generally refers to claims in arguments that are supported by 
probable premises assumed to be shared by the audience.”); James C. Raymond, Enthymemes, 
Examples, and Rhetorical Method, in ESSAYS ON CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND MODERN 
DISCOURSE 140 (Robert J. Connors et al. eds., 1983) (defining enthymemes as “those patterns of 
demonstration that presume upon the audience’s acceptance of assumptions, often unstated”).  
 79.  ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS: A CRITICAL GUIDE 17–18 (Thornton Lockwood & Thanassis 
Samaras eds., 2015). 
 80.  Ifill, supra note 18, at 440–41; see also Enid Trucious-Haynes & Cedric Merlin Powell, 
The Rhetoric of Colorblind Constitutionalism: Individualism, Race and Public Schools in Louis-
ville, Kentucky, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 947, 948 (2008). 
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ued the majoritarian faith and promoted the status quo.81  Thus, while the 
language of legal decisions no longer relies on explicit race-based rhetoric, 
the underlying narratives of historic lower court opinions retain vitality out-
side of the courts.82  The effect of these majoritarian narratives and their re-
liant themes is a continuing assumption that systemic inequality is natural, 
even acceptable.83  This is especially true in the realms where African-
American and white segregation is most socially apparent, such as higher 
education,84 housing,85 and public education.86 
II. RACIAL RHETORIC OF MISSOURI-BASED DECISIONS 
A.  The Rhetoric of “Separate but Equal”: State ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada 
1.  Social and Legal Context 
In 1868, the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment provided a new 
promise of equality.87  Majoritarian narratives, however, remained unaffect-
ed, and legal rhetoric evolved to incorporate that promise of equality into 
the narratives by harmonizing equality and separation.  “Separate but equal” 
became an ideograph for segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson.88  It was pre-
sented as “enlightened public policy” but was still “rooted in white suprem-
                                                          
 81.  Delgado, supra note 18, at 666; Ifill, supra note 18, at 439–40. 
 82.   Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 
2412 (1988); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Racial Double Helix: Watson, Crick, and 
Brown v. Board of Education (Our No-Bell Prize Award Speech), 47 HOW. L.J. 473, 476 (2004) 
(“[T]he gap between Whites and Blacks—and other non-White minorities—remains remarkably 
the same year after year, and that holds true whether you look at wages, longevity, infant mortali-
ty, school completion, family wealth, or anything else.”).  In this way, majoritarian narratives hi-
jack what James B. White refers to as the “machine” in order to subvert justice and equality.  See 
James Boyd White, Imagining the Law, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW, supra note 74, at 32–34. 
 83.  See Delgado, supra note 82, at 2413.  
 84.  ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE & JEFF STROHL, SEPARATE & UNEQUAL: HOW HIGHER 
EDUCATION REINFORCES THE INTERGENERATIONAL REPRODUCTION OF WHITE RACIAL 
PRIVILEGE 29, 37 (2013), https://cew.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/SeparateUne 
qual.FR_.pdf. 
 85.  JOHN R. BROWN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL IN SUBURBIA 4, 11 (2010), 
https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity/Data/Report/report12012014.pdf; JOHN R. LOGAN, 
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR BLACKS, HISPANICS AND ASIANS IN 
METROPOLITAN AMERICA 1 (2011), https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity/Data/Report/repor 
t0727.pdf. 
 86.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-345, K-12 EDUCATION: BETTER USE OF 
INFORMATION COULD HELP AGENCIES IDENTIFY DISPARITIES AND ADDRESS RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION 10 (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676745.pdf. 
 87.  Primary Documents in American History: 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, LIB. 
OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/14thamendment.html (last updated Nov. 
25, 2015).  
 88.  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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acy.”89  That is, the word “equal” was “not really about treating people the 
same, but about the reasonableness of the lines that the government inevita-
bly dr[ew] in treating people differently.”90  Thus, this rhetoric allowed the 
Court to reconcile the Fourteenth Amendment with majoritarian narratives. 
In the 1930s, the NAACP launched a concerted campaign to battle 
“separate but equal,” with an incremental legal assault on segregated educa-
tion, in an effort to build support for a direct attack of Plessy.91  The plan 
was to attack educational inequality because of education’s “centrality to 
advancement and fulfillment within American culture.”92  To accomplish 
this, the NAACP employed a three pronged approach: (1) addressing 
“[d]esegregation of public graduate and professional schools,” (2) fighting 
for equalization of salaries among African-American and white teachers, 
and (3) opposing segregation of elementary and secondary schools.93 
For its vehicle to reach the United States Supreme Court, the NAACP 
chose Missouri’s segregated university system94: 
 Missouri is a border state.  Negroes vote there.  Two Negro leg-
islators have been in the state capitol in recent times—the first in 
the 1920’s.  On three sides Missouri is bounded by Kansas, Iowa 
and Illinois.  It has a great liberal newspaper, the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch.  What better place to pitch a battle?95 
As the NAACP was preparing for its Missouri challenge, Lloyd 
Gaines was graduating from Lincoln University—Missouri’s African-
American college—with an exemplary academic record.96  He wanted to be 
a lawyer, but Lincoln University did not offer a law degree.97  Although 
Gaines knew that the University of Missouri did not accept African-
American students, he applied to its law school because he wanted to attend 
a school that was, in part, funded by “the taxes of his family.”98  His appli-
                                                          
 89.  MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 8 (2007); Waldo E. Martin, Jr., Introduction to BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A 
BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 1, 22 (Waldo E. Martin, Jr. ed., 1998). 
 90.  Kull, supra note 34, at 158. 
 91.  Martin, Jr., supra note 89, at 7, 13. 
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Id. at 13–14. 
 94.  JAMES ENDERSBY & WILLIAM HORNER, LLOYD GAINES AND THE FIGHT TO END 
SEGREGATION 55 (2016) (noting the NAACP first successfully challenged segregated law schools 
in Maryland in Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 169 Md. 478 (1936), but Maryland did not appeal 
and the precedential value was limited). 
 95.  Roy Wilkins, Citizenship Rights and Sociology, CRISIS, July 1939, at 193, 209. 
 96.  Lucile Bluford, The Lloyd Gaines Story, 32 J. ED. SOC. 242, 242–43 (1959). 
 97.  Id. at 243. 
 98.  Id.  
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cation was rejected because of his race.99  During Gaines’s application pro-
cess, the NAACP took him on as a client and filed a writ of mandamus ask-
ing the Boone County Circuit Court to order the University of Missouri to 
admit Gaines to the law school.100  The Circuit Court denied the writ, and 
the NAACP appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court.101 
2.  Missouri Supreme Court 
The Missouri Supreme Court used three rhetorical techniques to affirm 
the circuit court decision.  First, the court used the theme of black imposi-
tion to prejudice the reader against Gaines before addressing the merits of 
his claim.  Second, the court used black abstraction to transform a facially 
neutral law governing admission to the University of Missouri into one 
meant to benefit only white students.  Third, in failing to articulate the actu-
al premise for why Gaines should not attend the University of Missouri 
Law School, the court relied on an enthymeme to support its application of 
“separate but equal” jurisprudence. 
To establish Gaines as an imposter, the entire first section of the opin-
ion did nothing more than articulate the numerous educational opportunities 
provided to Gaines by the state: “He was educated in the public schools 
maintained by the State for the education of negroes, including education in 
the common school, high school, and Lincoln University.”102  The court re-
lied on the Missouri Constitution and Missouri statutes to argue that Mis-
souri laws not only allowed, but also required, segregation.103  The Missouri 
Constitution provided: “Separate free public schools shall be established for 
the education of children of African descent.”104  Missouri statutes made it 
“unlawful” for African-American and white students to attend the same 
school; the statutes further provided for the establishment of separate 
schools for African-American students when enrollment required it and 
transfers to an African-American school when enrollment was insufficient 
for the establishment of a new school.105  To harmonize these laws with the 
                                                          
 99.  Id.  It was over six months later that an admissions decision was finally made when the 
Board of Curators adopted a statement rejecting Gaines’s application explicitly because of his 
race.  The Board of Curators justified its decision because of the ample opportunity that Lincoln 
University provided and because the State would pay Gaines’s tuition to a law school in a neigh-
boring state until such time as Lincoln University established a law school.  Id. 
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Id. 
 102.  State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 113 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Mo. 1937) (en banc), rev’d, 305 
U.S. 337 (1938). 
 103.  Id. at 785–87. 
 104.  Id. at 785 (quoting MO. CONST. art XI, § 3). 
 105.  Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 9216–17 (1929)). 
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“separate but equal” jurisprudence, the court posited a cursory conclusion 
that the separate educational opportunities were “equal.”106 
The court, therefore, used the theme of imposition to impugn Gaines 
by presenting his requested reform as outrageous107—contrary to the laws, 
the public policy, and the constitution of Missouri.  The laws used to set the 
stage and incorporate this seemingly outrageous result, however, were ap-
plicable only to secondary education.108  Therefore, the inclusion and depth 
of treatment of those laws was valuable solely for the rhetorical purpose of 
incorporating the black imposition theme into the opinion to discredit 
Gaines. 
As the court turned to the first legal issue—whether the state’s laws, 
constitution, or public policy prohibited integration in higher education—it 
resorted to black abstraction to discount a statute that, on its face, should 
have allowed Gaines’s admission to the University of Missouri.109  Missouri 
Revised Statute Section 9657 stated: “All youths, resident of the state of 
Missouri, over the age of sixteen years, shall be admitted to all the privileg-
es and advantages of the various classes of all the departments of the uni-
versity of the state of Missouri without payment of tuition.”110  Despite the 
facially neutral language of the statute, the court concluded that it was “ob-
vious” that the legislative intent (and the public policy of the state) was to 
keep the races separate at the university level.111  But in order to reach this 
“obvious” conclusion, the court had to read the phrase, “all youths,” as re-
ferring to only all white youths.  The court contended that the statutory es-
tablishment of Lincoln University was evidence of the legislature’s “clear 
intention” to provide “equal opportunity for higher education, but in sepa-
rate schools.”112  This position could be perceived as palatable only because 
of the court’s use of black abstraction to present the seemingly inclusive 
statutory language as exclusionary. 
Having established that segregated higher education was the law in 
Missouri, the court used an enthymeme to harmonize this outcome with the 
federal “separate but equal” rhetoric.  First, the court criticized Gaines for 
not applying for legal studies at Lincoln University, despite the fact that no 
such program existed.113  The court reasoned that the Board of Curators 
would have been obligated to consider opening a law school upon such a 
                                                          
 106.  Id. at 788. 
 107.  Cf. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 60, at 1043. 
 108.  Gaines, 113 S.W.2d at 785. 
 109.  Id. at 786. 
 110.  Id. at 787 (emphasis added).  
 111.  Id.  
 112.  Id. at 786–87 (emphasis added). 
 113.  Id. at 789. 
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request.114  But the court did not address the logical disconnect of expecting 
a student to apply to a program that did not exist. Second, the court elabo-
rately detailed the equality of costs and program components in the neigh-
boring states of Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska, where Gaines could 
attend law school at Missouri’s expense.115  The court failed to address, 
however, why Missouri could pay for an integrated education elsewhere, 
even though integrated education was seemingly abhorrent to the public 
policy of Missouri.116  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the court nev-
er stated why it was objectionable for Gaines to attend the University of 
Missouri.  This premise did not need to be said because segregation was so 
ingrained in majoritarian narratives that the premise could simply be as-
sumed as truth. 
3.  United States Supreme Court 
Gaines and the NAACP appealed to the Supreme Court of the United 
States.117  The Supreme Court used neutral judicial rhetoric to reverse and 
remand to the Missouri Supreme Court.118  Yet the Court did not address 
the majoritarian narrative of keeping African-American students out of an 
all-white university.  The Court never described the personal story of Lloyd 
Gaines, other than to identify him as “a negro, [who] was refused admission 
to the School of Law at the State University of Missouri.”119  Nor did the 
Court mention the funding disparities between the University of Missouri 
and Lincoln University and how those disparities might affect the equality 
of the programs offered. 
Instead, the Court rested its decision on (1) the obligation of Missouri 
to provide an equal law school opportunity within its state borders and (2) 
the lack of any equal opportunity for Gaines to attend law school in Mis-
souri.120  Therefore, the Court concluded that Gaines “was entitled to be 
admitted to the law school of the State University in the absence of other 
and proper provision for his legal training within the State.”121  In this way, 
the Court left open the question of whether Missouri could continue its seg-
regationist policies if the State opened a law school at Lincoln University 
instead of allowing Gaines admission to the University of Missouri.122  This 
                                                          
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Id.  
 116.  See id.  
 117.  Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 342 (1938). 
 118.  See id. at 352. 
 119.  Id. at 342. 
 120.  See id. at 352. 
 121.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 122.  Id. at 349–50. 
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limited victory served as the first federal case in the NAACP’s incremental 
attack on “separate but equal.”123 
4.  Outcomes 
The battle in Missouri was not over.  Rather than admit Gaines to the 
state law school, the legislature passed the Taylor Bill, which authorized 
$200,000 to establish an African-American law school in St. Louis.124 
On remand, the Missouri Supreme Court again heard Gaines and sent 
the case to the Boone County Circuit Court to determine whether the Afri-
can-American law school in St. Louis was “substantially equivalent” to the 
law school at the University of Missouri.125  But that determination was 
never made; Gaines inexplicably disappeared, and the NAACP was forced 
to withdraw its case.126 
The NAACP pushed on in Missouri, taking on the case of Lucille 
Bluford, an African-American journalist with a degree from the University 
of Kansas.127  Bluford applied to attend the University of Missouri Journal-
ism Graduate School in both January and September of 1939.128  In Bluford 
v. Canada,129 the Missouri Supreme Court stood behind its “separate but 
equal” rhetoric.130  It evaluated Bluford’s claim under new legislation, 
which required the Board of Curators to create new African-American 
graduate programs upon “demand,” and then found that Bluford “made in-
quiry (but not demand) to the President of Lincoln about a course of jour-
nalism in that school.”131  In this way, the court distinguished Bluford from 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Gaines.132   
Despite the 1939 NAACP victory in Gaines, the University of Mis-
souri did not enroll its first African-American students until 1950.133  In the 
fall of 2015, one of the student groups protesting at the University of Mis-
                                                          
 123.  Wilkins, supra note 95, at 209.  After the decision, the NAACP reflected, “[t]he South 
needed a reminder that its procedure was not in accord with the American ideal.  The Gaines case 
was that reminder.”  Id. 
 124.  Bluford, supra note 96, at 244.  
 125.  State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 131 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Mo. 1939) (en banc). 
 126.  Bluford, supra note 96, at 245–46. 
 127.  State ex rel. Bluford v. Canada, 153 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Mo. 1941). 
 128.  Id. at 14. 
 129.  153 S.W.2d 12 (Mo. 1941). 
 130.  See id. at 17. 
 131.  Id. at 15–16. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Dale Smith & Erik Potter, A Timeline of Mizzou Achievements, MAG. MIZZOU ALUMNI 
ASS’N, https://mizzoumag.missouri.edu/2013/11/a-timeline-of-mizzou-achievements/ (last updat-
ed Nov. 22, 2013). 
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souri linked its struggle to the Gaines and Bluford stories by identifying it-
self as Concerned Student 1950.134 
B.  The Rhetoric of Property Rights: Kraemer v. Shelley 
1.  Social and Legal Context 
One majoritarian narrative of housing in the twentieth century is a sto-
ry of white value and black destruction.  For example, 1915 propaganda by 
the St. Louis United Welfare Association urged residents to vote for a racial 
zoning ordinance that would institute housing segregation.135  In a postcard 
picturing a row of houses, the Association showed “[a]n entire block ruined 
by negro invasion” and declared, “SAVE YOUR HOME! VOTE FOR 
SEGREGATION!”136  In a special election, St. Louis voters adopted the ra-
cially exclusionary zoning ordinance by a margin of 52,220 to 27,877.137 
But in 1917, the Unites States Supreme Court ruled that racial zoning 
laws similar to the one passed by St. Louis voters violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.138  That ruling, however, did not destroy the majoritarian 
housing narrative, and white homeowners found a new way to “save” them-
selves and their property through the use of racially restrictive covenants.139  
Courts upheld these agreements under the auspices that the covenants were 
private actions, not state actions covered by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and white residents quickly adopted restrictive covenants as a means of pre-
serving the perceived value of their property.140 
Often lost in this story of white property owners and their property 
value was the counter-narrative of African-American homeowners and ten-
ants.  By the 1940s, juxtaposed with white residents’ concern for property 
values, was an African-American populace with increased job opportuni-
                                                          
 134.  Alicia Lu, What Is Concerned Student 1950? The University of Missouri Peaceful Pro-
tests Were Led by a Standout Organization, BUSTLE (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.bustle.com/ar 
ticles/122575-what-is-concerned-student-1950-the-university-of-missouri-peaceful-protests-were-
led-by-a-standout. 
 135.  Postcard, United Welfare Association (1915), http://mappingdecline.lib.uiowa.edu/_in 
cludes/documents/rp_doc7.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).  The propaganda came from the United 
Welfare Association, an “umbrella group” for various improvement groups, which “advocate[d] 
for a racially exclusionary zoning ordinance.”  LANA STEIN, ST. LOUIS POLITICS: THE TRIUMPH 
OF TRADITION 14 (2002); Oliveri, supra note 26, at 1055. 
 136.  See Postcard, supra note 135. 
 137.  STEIN, supra note 135, at 15. 
 138.  See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917). 
 139.  Oliveri, supra note 26, at 1055. 
 140.  Wendell E. Pritchett, Shelley v. Kraemer: Racial Liberalism and the U.S. Supreme Court, 
in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 5, 7–8 (Myriam E. Gilles & Risa L. Goluboff eds., 2008); Rose, supra 
note 39, at 204–06 (providing an overview of judicial lenience for racially restrictive covenants 
and stating, “Nowhere, . . . was this lenience towards racial restrictions more evident than in the 
case history of Shelley itself”). 
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ties, income, and a “desire for decent housing.”141  Due to racially restric-
tive covenants, however, while the African-American population in St. 
Louis grew from 40,000 in 1910 to more than 117,000 by the mid-1940s, 
the area in which African Americans could live was “narrowed, surrounded 
and circumscribed almost completely.”142  African-American families were 
forced into overcrowded housing, with multiple families sharing dwellings 
designed for one.143  This overcrowding naturally led to an increase in mor-
tality rates, health problems, crime, and rent costs.144  Large numbers of Af-
rican-American families were forced to pay inflated prices for substandard 
living conditions and, due to restrictive covenants, were unable to buy new 
suburban homes despite their ability to afford them.145 
In this setting, on September 11, 1945, J.D. and Ethel Shelley moved 
into the lower portion of a rowhouse at 4600 Labadie Avenue that they had 
purchased for $5,700.146  By the end of the day, the Shelleys’ neighbors, 
with the assistance of the Marcus Avenue Improvement Association, 
brought a lawsuit to enforce a racially restrictive neighborhood covenant 
against the Shelleys.147  The covenant, created in 1911 for “the property 
fronting on Labadie Avenue,” stated that “no part of said property or any 
portion thereof shall be, for said term of Fifty-years, occupied by any per-
son not of the Caucasian race,” and it explicitly prohibited occupancy “by 
people of the Negro or Mongolian Race.”148 
                                                          
 141.  Pritchett, supra note 140, at 8–9.  Additionally, the brief written to the Supreme Court on 
behalf of Orsel and Minnie McGhee (in a case that the Court consolidated with Shelley) stated: 
“At the end of [World War II], income distribution among colored American citizens in the north-
ern urban centers more nearly approximated that obtaining for the entire population than ever be-
fore.”  Brief for Petitioners, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S 1 (1948) (No. 87), 1947 WL 30427, at 
*82. 
 142.  Transcript of Record at 23–24, Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. 1946) (No. 
39997) (en banc), rev’d, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 143.  Id. at 24.  In St. Louis, 20.2% of African Americans were living in dwellings with more 
than 1.5 persons per room, compared to only 5.1% of whites.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 
141, at 52. 
 144.  Id. at 56–59, 66. 
 145.  Id. at 83; Transcript of Record, supra note 142, at 24 (“[A]nother result . . . is to increase 
the rental which they pay far beyond that paid by the average city dweller for even better housing 
accommodations, and Negroes are compelled to pay much higher prices for the property they buy 
to live in than white citizens.”). 
 146.  Transcript of Record, supra note 142, at 181–82, 184; VOSE, supra note 39, at 110–11. 
 147.  Kraemer, 198 S.W.2d at 680–81; VOSE, supra note 39, at 111–12.  On Oct. 9, 1945, the 
court issued a temporary restraining order barring the Shelley’s from their home until after a hear-
ing.  Transcript of Record, supra note 142, at 12–13. 
 148.  Kraemer, 198 S.W.2d at 681. 
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2.  Missouri Supreme Court 
In a decision reflecting a continuation of a majoritarian narrative to 
protect the property rights of “innocent” white homeowners, the Missouri 
Supreme Court divested the Shelleys of both their property and their right 
to equality under the law.149  The opinion employed black abstraction to 
remove the Shelleys from the court’s story, and then shifted the focus to 
white innocence by emphasizing the rights of the white homeowners to cre-
ate racially restrictive covenants.  Additionally, the court professed its own 
inability to correct segregated housing.  Finally, the court relied on suppos-
edly neutral rhetoric to uphold the covenant while still employing logic 
based on explicitly racially charged precedent and enthymemes suggesting 
that the presence of African-American homeowners decreased property val-
ues. 
The court’s inevitable holding was clear from the opinion’s opening 
theme of black abstraction.  The court began its story by describing white 
property owners unremarkably signing a racially restrictive covenant: “In 
1911 some of the owners of the property fronting on both sides of Labadie 
Avenue . . . signed the restrictive agreement set out below.”150  The court 
did not begin with J.D. and Ethel purchasing their home, nor did the court 
set the stage by telling the history of racially restrictive covenants in Amer-
ica, generally, or St. Louis, in particular.151  In fact, the court neglected to 
refer to the Shelleys at all until the end of the second paragraph.152  And, 
even then, the court simply described the Shelleys as “defendants Shelley 
and his wife, negroes, who are occupying the premises.”153  From the 
court’s first few sentences, the reader could predict the outcome.  It was 
clear that the story to be told, the story that mattered, was the story of the 
white property owners’ rights; the African-American property owners were 
abstract, auxiliary to the court’s holding.154 
In following majoritarian housing narratives, the court needed to justi-
fy why, under the Fourteenth Amendment, judicial enforcement of racially 
discriminatory covenants was acceptable.  Relying on the theme of white 
innocence, the court used seemingly neutral reasoning, not to avoid a dis-
cussion of equal rights, but instead to focus on the importance of protecting 
the equal rights of white homeowners to contract.155  Under this view of the 
                                                          
 149.  See id. at 682–83.  
 150.  Id. at 680.  
 151.  See id.  
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Cf. Ross, Rhetorical Tapestry, supra note 59, at 6–7 (explaining that courts have used 
black abstraction to “blunt” a reader’s empathy).  
 155.  Kraemer, 198 S.W.2d at 682–83. 
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state and federal equal protection amendments, the court concluded that 
sustaining the Shelleys’ claim would “deny the [white] parties to such an 
agreement one of the fundamental privileges of citizenship, access to the 
courts.”156 
But while white citizens’ access to the court was a fundamental privi-
lege, the court distanced itself from sharing any blame over how that access 
led to judicial enforcement of racial covenants.  The court determined that it 
was unable to remedy the racial harms of housing segregation or address 
white collective responsibility for then-current policies and practices, be-
cause that was a matter for the legislature and not the court.  The court re-
lied on the rhetoric of judicial restraint to limit its own power and responsi-
bility to address societal issues157 and stated that, while the trial court found 
housing segregation caused social ills,158 those facts were irrelevant.159  The 
court thus failed to acknowledge its role or responsibility in ameliorating 
the discriminatory regime courts routinely enforced. 
Instead, the court’s rhetoric concealed aspects of majoritarian narra-
tives through seemingly neutral language and the use of enthymemes.  For 
example, at no time did the court discuss why white homeowners created 
racially restrictive covenants.  The law, the understood dominant truth, was 
written by a white author for a white audience who shared the same narra-
tive and the same assumptions.160  And in this narrative, readers understood 
the reason why white homeowners did not want African Americans living 
in their neighborhoods.  That narrative was so deeply understood that it did 
not need to be acknowledged.161  Providing the details of the narrative 
risked revealing that the “neutral” language used by the court was merely a 
facade for its discriminatory reasoning.162 
                                                          
 156.  Id. at 683.   
 157.  Cf. Ross, Rhetorical Tapestry, supra note 59, at 5 (using the phrase “judicial helpless-
ness” to argue that judges, like Justice Taney in Dred Scott, rely on precedent to keep the court 
from enacting change). 
 158.  See Transcript of Record, supra note 142, at 217. 
 159.  Kraemer, 198 S.W.2d at 683. 
 160.  Cf. White, supra note 47, at 692;  Ross, supra note 48, at 399–406 (writing about how 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. relied on “[w]hite [i]magination” 
and the reader to provide “vividness” to “language which seems abstract, formal, and quite ordi-
nary”). 
 161.  See RICHARD R. W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: 
RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 164 (2013) (“[W]hen courts 
held that these covenants were valid, they had to assume a background social norm of racism.”).  
For more on assuming majoritarian narratives as truth, see Delgado, supra note 18, at 670–71.  
See also Delgado, Making Pets, supra note 57, at 1580–81.  
 162.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 524 (1985) 
(“The state’s law that permits enforcement of such contracts is hardly value neutral; it makes a 
choice to favor discrimination over equality.”). 
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 The court employed another enthymeme when it found the restrictive 
convent conferred a benefit to white homeowners without stating explicitly 
what that benefit was.  The unstated assumption, understood by the readers, 
was that there was a benefit in keeping African Americans out of white 
neighborhoods, or at least in “prevent[ing] greatly increased occupancy by 
negroes.”163  Thus, this use of enthymemes granted the court the ability to 
continue to rely on majoritarian language from prior cases while simultane-
ously shifting to seemingly egalitarian rhetoric.  For example, when sug-
gesting that racially restrictive covenants did not violate public policy, the 
court cited to a 1918 case, which held it was acceptable for white home-
owners to use covenants to “preserve” property from African Americans.164  
Similarly, the court cited to a 1931 case that used the imagery of white 
homeowners collecting signatures for neighborhood restriction agreements 
“to protect the neighborhood against negro invasion” and “to block the 
stampede of negroes.”165  In yet another case relied on by Shelley, the court 
referred to “negro occupancy” as an “encroachment.”166  By relying on 
these cases and basing its logic on explicit race-based decisions, the court 
continued a majoritarian narrative that demanded the Shelleys lose their 
home solely because of their race while at the same time presenting the 
court as a neutral actor simply upholding the right of white homeowners to 
contract. 
3.  United States Supreme Court 
Following the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Kraemer v. Shel-
ley, African-American community leaders created the Real Estate Brokers 
Association of St. Louis, an organization with a goal of ending restrictive 
covenants and taking the Shelleys’ case to the United States Supreme 
Court.167  The Association published “A Call to Action” in the African-
American newspaper The St. Louis Argus, explaining the impact of the 
Kraemer decision and soliciting donations.168 
                                                          
 163.  See Kraemer, 198 S.W.2d at 682; see also BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 161, at 151; 
Rose, supra note 39, at 212. 
 164.  Kraemer, 198 S.W.2d at 682 (citing Koehler v. Rowland, 205 S.W. 217 (Mo. 1918) (per 
curiam)); see Koehler, 205 S.W. at 220. 
 165.  Kraemer, 198 S.W.2d at 682 (citing Pickel v. McCawley, 44 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. 1931) (per 
curiam)); see Pickel, 44 S.W.2d at 860. 
 166.  Kraemer, 198 S.W.2d at 682 (citing Porter v. Pryor, 164 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Mo. 1942) 
(per curiam)); see Porter, 164 S.W.2d at 355. 
 167.  JEFFREY D. GONDA, UNJUST DEEDS: THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES AND THE 
MAKING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 97 (2015); VOSE, supra note 39, at 119. 
 168.  VOSE, supra note 39, at 120. 
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The Shelleys and the Association succeeded in obtaining certiorari 
from the United States Supreme Court.169  But they were not alone.  Sipes v. 
McGhee,170 a case out of Michigan, reached the Court at the same time.  
The petitioners’ brief for Orson and Minnie McGhee told the story that the 
Missouri Supreme Court was hesitant to tell.  Co-written by Thurgood Mar-
shall, the brief rebutted hidden majoritarian narratives and the unstated as-
sumptions underlying the decisions from both Missouri and Michigan: 
 Are there any such justifications for the racial restrictive cove-
nants?  Is it true, as has been loosely alleged, that the invasion of 
the Negro destroys the property?  The evidence compiled by 
housing and real estate experts is conclusive to the contrary.171 
The white respondents in McGhee relied on the theme of black imposi-
tion, contending that denying the white homeowners the right to create ra-
cially restrictive covenants would mean “that the Negro petitioners, and 
Negroes generally, [would] have rights superior to and beyond white citi-
zens.”172  Similarly, in their response brief, the Kraemers did not deny dis-
criminatory motives.  They did not, however, expressly concede that point 
either; instead, they argued that imposition and equality would essentially 
lead to outrageous results173: 
[T]hen no contract could be made whereby a negro could be re-
fused service in a restaurant; no contract could be enforced the 
provisions of which denied a negro participation at a dance place; 
no contract could be made whereby a party to it could refuse, be-
cause bound by a contract, to admit a negro to a private swim-
ming pool.174 
But even with the counter-narrative in hand, and even deciding the 
case in favor of the Shelleys,175 the U.S. Supreme Court still did not articu-
late the majoritarian narrative of exclusion or its discriminatory precepts.  
Further, the Court failed to tell the story of overcrowded African-American 
neighborhoods and the overwhelming need for fair housing.  Instead, the 
                                                          
 169.  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 170.  25 N.W.2d 638 (Mich. 1947). 
 171.  Brief for Petitioners, McGhee v. Sipes, 331 U.S. 804 (1947) (No. 87), 1947 WL 30427, at 
*72. 
 172.  Brief for Respondents in Reply to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 1–2, Shel-
ley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (Nos. 87, 290, 291), 1948 WL 31625, at *2. 
 173.  Cf. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 60, at 1043–45 (noting that black imposition relies 
on arguing that the reformer is seeking a ridiculous remedy). 
 174.  Respondents’ Brief Opposing Issuance of Writ of Certiorari, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
U.S. 1 (1948) (No. 72), 1947 WL 30431, at *15.  
 175.  See Barbara J. Flagg, “And Grace Will Lead Me Home”: The Case for Judicial Race Ac-
tivism, 4 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 103, 125 (2013) (noting the opinion “fairly can be said to re-
flect an anti-subordinationist vision of race equality”). 
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Court used neutral language to decide the case for the Shelleys, emphasiz-
ing the balance between the law of equality and the law of property rights: 
“The Constitution confers upon no individual the right to demand action by 
the State which results in the denial of equal protection of the laws to other 
individuals.”176  Therefore, while the Court in Shelley began to erode ex-
plicitly race-based rhetoric, the Court did not discuss the history of discrim-
ination or its effects on African-American citizens.177 
4.  Outcomes 
Although the United States Supreme Court’s decision was a landmark 
victory for civil rights, the ingrained majoritarian narrative, the “myth of 
‘property values,’”178 led white homeowners to employ other means to con-
tinue segregated housing.  These tactics included “steer[ing]” by real estate 
agents and real estate organizations,179 discriminatory policies of the lenders 
and the Federal Housing Administration,180 and outright violence.181  Con-
tinued activism helped create the Fair Housing Act of 1968,182 but some 
commentators argue that the Act does not go far enough.183 
Today, true fair housing remains elusive.184  Majoritarian narratives 
that promote segregating whites from African Americans continue,185 with 
“white market abandonment and resource withdrawal” still an unstated as-
sumption.186  St. Louis remains one of America’s most segregated cities.187 
                                                          
 176.  Shelley, 334 U.S. at 22.  
 177.  See Cedric Merlin Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality: Colorblindness, Frederick Douglass, 
and Inverted Critical Race Theory, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 823, 832–33 (2008).  
 178.  VOSE, supra note 39, at 227. 
 179.  Rose, supra note 39, at 219.  
 180.  VOSE, supra note 39, at 225 (noting the Federal Housing Administration “made a prac-
tice of refusing to insure loans” to African Americans wishing to purchase in “white areas”); 
Rose, supra note 39, at 219. 
 181.  Pritchett, supra note 140, at 22 (“In Chicago . . . there were dozens of attacks by whites 
on black newcomers in the late 1940s.”). 
 182.  Id. at 23. 
 183.  See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 428 (6th ed. 2008) (not-
ing that the FHA relies on enforcement “by overburdened agencies or injured individuals who typ-
ically have few resources”). 
 184.  Id. at 427–28.  
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Margalynne Armstrong, Race and Property Values in Entrenched Segregation, 52 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1051, 1059 (1998). 
 187.  Oliveri, supra note 26, at 1053. 
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C.  The Rhetoric of School Desegregation: Liddell v. Board of 
Education 
1.  Social and Legal Context 
Despite the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 
efforts to desegregate St. Louis schools—once the nation’s second-largest 
segregated school system188—were stifled.189  The segregated schooling re-
quirements articulated in Gaines ensured a separate and unequal dual school 
system.  In fact, it was not until 1976 that the provision of Missouri’s con-
stitution segregating primary and secondary schools was officially re-
pealed.190  Moreover, housing discrimination in St. Louis continued post-
Shelley, with many African-American residents “confined to segregated, di-
lapidated neighborhoods,” while white residents fled to the suburbs.191  In 
the early 1970s, there had been little progress towards integration192; two-
thirds of the students in St. Louis were African American, and “90 percent 
of the schools had enrollments that were 90 percent or more of one race.”193  
Within predominantly African-American schools, students were taught with 
outdated textbooks in “substantially overcrowded” and “dilapidated build-
ings.”194 
On the national level, headway towards integration ended in 1974, 
twenty years after the Court’s holding in Brown, when the Supreme Court 
began the “resegregation era.”195  In Milliken v. Bradley,196 the Court struck 
                                                          
 188.  Nikole Hannah-Jones, School Segregation, the Continuing Tragedy of Ferguson, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/ferguson-school-segregation. 
 189.  See GERALD W. HEANEY & SUSAN UCHITELLE, UNENDING STRUGGLE: THE LONG 
ROAD TO AN EQUAL EDUCATION IN ST. LOUIS 17 (2004). 
 190.  Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1280 (8th Cir. 1980).  
 191.  HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 189, at 16–17; Tim O’Neil, Look Back: Lengthy De-
segregation Case Puts Thousands of Students on Buses, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 4, 2015), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/look-back-lengthy-desegregation-case-puts-thousands-
of-students-on/article_a2243e6c-a164-5e00-885d-2c0ede29a00d.html. 
 192.  HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 189, at 17. 
 193.  O’Neil, supra note 191. 
 194.  Kimberly Jade Norwood, Minnie Liddell’s Forty-Year Quest for Quality Public Educa-
tion Remains a Dream Deferred, 40 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2012).  Several articles have 
already been written about court decisions regarding desegregating Kansas City public schools in 
the Jenkins cases.  See, e.g., José F. Anderson, Perspectives on Missouri v. Jenkins: Abandoning 
the Unfinished Business of Public School Desegregation ‘With All Deliberate Speed’, 39 HOW. 
L.J. 693 (1996); Richard A. Epstein, The Remote Causes of Affirmative Action, or School Deseg-
regation in Kansas City, Missouri, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1101 (1996); Bradley W. Joondeph, Missouri 
v. Jenkins and the De Facto Abandonment of Court-Enforced Desegregation, 71 WASH. L. REV. 
597 (1996); Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas 
Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475 (1999). 
 195.  Thomas F. Pettigrew, Justice Deferred: A Half Century After Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 59 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 521, 523 (2004). 
 196.  418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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down an interdistrict desegregation plan, because while there was evidence 
of de jure segregation within the school district, that was insufficient to in-
clude surrounding school districts in the remedy.197  Thus, the Milliken de-
cision removed one of the only effective means of desegregating urban cit-
ies—interdistrict busing.198  The combination of predominantly African-
American, urban school districts and their inability to integrate with white 
suburbs led to resegregation.199  Thus, a few short years after the Court fi-
nally articulated an ultimate goal of integration, the Court, in essence, ended 
all progress towards that goal. 
The Milliken decision could not have come at a worse time for St. 
Louis.  Two years earlier, in 1972, a St. Louis mother, Minnie Liddell, had 
finally had enough.  Faced with poor schools and the St. Louis Public 
School Board’s “repeated redrawing of attendance lines and the constant 
opening and closing of black schools,”200  Ms. Liddell brought a class ac-
tion lawsuit in federal court, commencing a decades-long court battle.201 
On Christmas Eve, 1975, the Liddell plaintiffs and the Board finally 
reached a consent decree.202  Under the agreement, the Board agreed to in-
crease the percentage of minority teachers, but it denied culpability for run-
ning a segregated school system.203  The Board further agreed only to 
“study” feeder school realignments and “consider” elementary magnet 
schools, among other means to relieve “residence-based racial imbal-
ance.”204  Busing was not contemplated.  And, in accordance with Milliken, 
the court-approved decree reached only the St. Louis Public School District; 
St. Louis County schools were not part of the agreement.205   
                                                          
 197.  Id. at 745–47.  The Court concluded: “Where the schools of only one district have been 
affected, there is no constitutional power in the courts to decree relief balancing the racial compo-
sition of that district’s schools with those of the surrounding districts.”  Id. at 749. 
 198.  Pettigrew, supra note 195, at 523; see Cedric Merlin Powell, From Louisville to Liddell: 
Schools, Rhetorical Neutrality, and the Post-Racial Equal Protection Clause, 40 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 153, 166 (2012) (styling Milliken as a “retreat from substantive equality to a process-based 
conception of individual rights”); Ross, Rhetorical Tapestry, supra note 59, at 27 (calling Milliken 
“the end of the promise of Brown for public school integration”). 
 199.  James E. Ryan, Comment, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 131, 140 (2007) (“[U]rban districts were typically required to engage in all-out busing be-
cause of Swann, while Milliken ensured that the suburbs remained off limits.  The combination 
was deadly.  Extensive busing within cities gave those with economic means a reason to flee to 
the suburbs, and Milliken promised them that they would be safe upon arrival.”). 
 200.  HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 189, at 19; Norwood, supra note 194, at 10. 
 201.  Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1979), rev’d sub nom. Adams v. 
United States, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1980).  To raise money for filing fees, Ms. Liddell and the 
other parents “held barbeques, dances, and bake sales.”  Norwood, supra note 194, at 13. 
 202.  Liddell, 469 F. Supp. at 1309. 
 203.  Id. at 1310. 
 204.  Id.; see also HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 189, at 86. 
 205.  Liddell, 469 F. Supp. at 1310. 
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Finding the agreement to be “woefully inadequate,”206 and believing 
the decree failed to create a unitary school system,207 the NAACP sought to 
intervene,208 with the NAACP’s national general counsel declaring, “If it 
takes busing to end segregation, so be it.”209  The district court denied the 
NAACP’s petition to intervene, and the NAACP appealed to the Eighth 
Circuit.210  The Eighth Circuit granted the petition and noted that Milliken 
“seemingly” prohibited interdistrict desegregation orders without a finding 
of overt racially discriminatory acts.211  The Eighth Circuit suggested, how-
ever, that Milliken did not prohibit “voluntary cooperation” between city 
and county schools to achieve desegregation.212 
The subsequent years of litigation brought dozens of decisions,213 only 
two of which are germane to this Essay.  First, in 1979, the Eastern District 
of Missouri held there was no proof of any “racially segregative purpose” 
by the St. Louis Public School Board and therefore ordered no remedy.214  
And second, in 1980, the Eighth Circuit reversed that decision and ordered 
the Board to develop a comprehensive integration plan.215 
2.  Eastern District of Missouri 
The 1979 district court ruling considered whether the St. Louis School 
Board’s de facto segregated schools discriminated against African-
American students.216  The decision was extensive—the culmination of a 
three-week trial in which approximately 1,200 exhibits were introduced.217  
The themes in the 1979 opinion paralleled the themes in Milliken.218  Pro-
fessor Ross analyzed those themes to highlight how black abstraction and 
white innocence controlled the rhetoric behind de facto segregated school 
                                                          
 206.  O’Neil, supra note 191. 
 207.  HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 189, at 86. 
 208.  See Liddell v. Caldwell, 546 F.2d 786, 769 (8th Cir. 1976); see also Norwood, supra note 
194, at 13–14 (discussing the impact of the NAACP’s intervention in making the case about inte-
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 209.  O’Neil, supra note 191 (quoting Nathaniel Jones, National General Counsel, NAACP). 
 210.  See Liddell, 546 F.2d at 774. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  See Maurice R. Dyson, Are We Really Racing to the Top or Leaving Behind the Bottom? 
Challenging Conventional Wisdom and Dismantling Institutional Repression, 40 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 181, 182 n.1 (noting citations to the Liddell litigation beginning in 1979). 
 214.  Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1979), rev’d sub nom. Adams v. 
United States, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 215.  See Adams, 620 F.2d at 1295–97. 
 216.  See generally Liddell, 469 F. Supp. at 1304.  
 217.  Id. at 1312. 
 218.  See Ross, Rhetorical Tapestry, supra note 59, at 26–28. 
 2017] RACE, RHETORIC, AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS 721 
 
systems and the court’s unwillingness to remedy the problem in Milliken.219  
Likewise, in Liddell, the court first used black abstraction to detract from 
any larger historical or social context behind the de facto segregated school 
system.  Second, the court used white innocence to conclude the Board did 
not commit any intentional wrongs. 
Using the theme of black abstraction, the court never provided any true 
counter-narratives of students and families attending segregated schools.  
Instead, it began by noting that the boundaries of the St. Louis Public 
School District had remained the same since 1876,220 and that post-Brown, 
“the State of Missouri effectively removed all barriers at the state level to 
desegregation of the schools.”221  In fact, the court’s only mention of any 
burdens faced by African-American students in a segregated school system 
pre-Brown was that busing students to the “core of the City” “resulted in 
some extremely large attendance zones for black schools.”222  Even in re-
viewing the evidence of pre-Brown living conditions for African-American 
students, the court buried the only real description of the harms of housing 
discrimination in a single sentence,223 before stating that there was merely a 
“tendency of certain groups of common race . . . to settle in certain areas of 
the City.”224 
 Instead, the court utilized the theme of white innocence by praising St. 
Louis School Board officials for working to desegregate post-Brown and 
detailing the steps the Board took to comply with the Supreme Court’s 
mandate.225  While the district court acknowledged the existence of 
“[r]esegrative [f]actors” post-Brown, it did not assign any blame to the 
Board or local actors.226  The court mentioned “[t]he exodus of whites and 
affluent blacks”227 to St. Louis County, but the court also stated that the 
moves were caused by a series of factors, beginning with an innocent 
                                                          
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Liddell, 469 F. Supp. at 1313. 
 221.  Id. at 1314. 
 222.  Id. at 1315. 
 223.  That sentence reads: “Nevertheless, as of 1954, segregation in housing existed due to pri-
vate discriminatory practices and actions and policies of the Federal Housing Administration.”  Id.  
Note the court’s use of passive voice. 
 224.  Id.  
 225.  See id. at 1316–17. 
 226.  See id. at 1318–26.  Elaborating on this point, Ross notes that in the Milliken decision: 
Burger’s rhetorical structure obscured the reality of white flight, thereby suggesting that 
the segregation of the suburban school districts was serendipitous or somehow mysteri-
ous.  This rhetorical move preserved the nonperpetrator status of the suburban school 
districts.  It also raised doubts about the victim status of the black school children 
locked into the segregated city school system.  After all, if this pattern of segregation 
just happened, no one is to blame and no one is a victim. 
Ross, Rhetorical Tapestry, supra note 59, at 28. 
 227.  Liddell, 469 F. Supp. at 1319.  
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enough reason—“widespread automobile ownership and building of ex-
pressways.”228  After listing additional reasons for white flight, including 
the allure of suburban homes and job opportunities, the court stated, in the 
middle of a forty-six-word sentence, that white flight was “accompanied, 
and partially caused or accelerated by the movement of the blacks” to his-
torically white neighborhoods.229  Regardless of the court’s rhetoric, the ef-
fects of white flight in the 1970s were monumental: “from 1970 to 1978 
approximately 30 [City] schools [were] closed,”230 and between the 1971-
72 and 1978-79 school years, white enrollment in the St. Louis Public 
School District dropped from 35,000 to 18,000.231 
The court additionally used white innocence to establish that the 
Board’s post-Brown assignment of students was not an intentional wrong. 
Post-Brown, the Board appeared to assign students to schools on a “neutral 
basis”—by drawing school boundaries based on neighborhoods.232  The 
court highlighted this as the Board’s “good faith” and stated that, “so long 
as neighborhood school attendance zones are not gerrymandered, or pupil 
assignments otherwise abused so as to foster segregation, the use of neigh-
borhood schools is allowed.”233  Thus, the court concluded that the Board 
should not be punished with desegregation orders because the Board com-
mitted no intentional wrong.234  The unstated premise of this enthymeme is 
that integration is a punishment.235  
This enthymeme was particularly effective because the Board did not 
need to gerrymander or abuse pupil assignments; the work was done for it.  
St. Louis’s historically segregated housing created segregated neighbor-
hoods. When the Board used those neighborhoods to draw school bounda-
ries, the inevitable result was segregated schools.  The court concluded by 
keeping the consent decree in effect and stating that any further plans 
should focus on “quality education, which includes integration of the races, 
where practical and feasible.”236 
                                                          
 228.  Id. 
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 230.  Id. at 1341. 
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3.  Eighth Circuit 
In a victory for school integration, the Eighth Circuit reversed the low-
er court decision and ordered the Board to “develop a system-wide plan for 
integrating” the St. Louis Public School District.237  Rejecting the theme of 
black abstraction, the court remarkably relied on historical context; the de-
cision began by recounting how Missouri outlawed education for African 
Americans “[p]rior to 1865” and that post-1865 state law required segrega-
tion.238  With this context, the court laid the foundation for the analysis and 
remedy to come, explaining how equal education has always been a strug-
gle in Missouri. 
Moving to more recent history, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the 
Board’s 1954-1956 neighborhood school plan could not have remedied seg-
regation post-Brown, because projections from the 1950s showed the plan 
would keep many schools completely or predominantly segregated.239  
Simply creating a neighborhood school system based on segregated neigh-
borhoods did not fulfill the Board’s duties.240  As the court stated, the Board 
“never dealt with [the] overwhelming reality” that pre-Brown segregated 
African-American schools stayed segregated because of the Board’s 
plans.241 
The Eighth Circuit stripped away the theme of white innocence when 
it assigned blame to the Board for perpetuating segregation by (1) using in-
tact busing, (2) opening new segregated schools, and (3) using block bus-
ing.  First, in the 1960s, the Board enacted intact busing—a policy of 
“send[ing] an entire class of [mostly African-American] students, with their 
teacher, from an overcrowded school to a vacant classroom” in “white 
schools.”242  Instead of integrating African-American students into the 
white schools, bused students attended a school within a school, often arriv-
ing, having recess, eating lunch, and departing on a separate schedule than 
other students in the school.243  Second, the Board opened thirty-six new el-
ementary schools between 1962 and 1975 to alleviate overcrowding, but 
only one was “integrated to any significant degree.”244  The Eighth Circuit 
recognized this as a “durable pattern of segregative school construction.”245  
Third, after ceasing intact busing, the Board instituted an era of block bus-
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ing.246  Thousands of students were bused to relieve overcrowding, but Af-
rican-American students were sent to predominately African-American 
schools and white students were sent to predominately white schools.247  By 
highlighting these policies, the Eighth Circuit did not permit the Board to 
hide behind white innocence; it found that the Board’s actions had, in fact, 
“enhanced” segregation in the St. Louis Public School District.248  The court 
reversed and remanded with instructions for the Board to “develop[] and 
implement[]” a comprehensive integration plan.249  
4.  Outcomes 
The Eighth Circuit’s break from majoritarian narratives and the 
Board’s subsequent comprehensive integration plan250 caused outcry from 
parents.251  Both sides of the Liddell litigation appealed to the Eighth Cir-
cuit, claiming that the plan went too far or not far enough.252  In the fall of 
1980, after the Eighth Circuit affirmed the order, however, over 7,500 stu-
dents were bused within St. Louis Public School District to alleviate segre-
gation.253 
A new district court judge took over the case and, in 1981, approved a 
voluntary expansion of the plan to include St. Louis County schools.254  
When only five districts initially participated, the judge stated he “would 
begin legal proceedings leading to a mandatory interdistrict desegregation 
plan.”255  Before the 1983 school year, all twenty-three County schools 
agreed to a settlement.256  The district court decision accepting the interdis-
trict settlement ended with an appendix extensively quoting a 1947 book 
titled Inside U.S.A. and overviewing Missouri’s historically segregated edu-
cation system, including the cases of Lloyd Gaines and Lucile Bluford.257 
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Even with the order, Missouri attorneys general continued to politicize 
the program.258  In 1999, the court-supervised program ended,259 and a 
“downsized” program managed by a private company took its place.260  
Since that time, fewer and fewer students have participated in the program, 
with approximately 4,470 city students participating in 2016, compared to 
13,263 students at the program’s peak in 1998—the year before court-
supervision ended.261 
In 2001, the state lowered the St. Louis Public School District’s rating 
to “Provisional Accreditation,” and it was not until 2015 that the District 
finally achieved scores qualifying it again for “Full Accreditation.”262  The 
desegregation program is currently winding down for a phase out by 
2024.263 
III. CONCLUSION 
When viewed through the lens of history, the long journey towards ed-
ucation and housing desegregation has fallen short.  The nation continues to 
suffer from segregated colleges, neighborhoods, schools, and an overall 
disparity in opportunities. 
The three lower court cases presented in this Essay all relied on the 
same assumptions: there is no collective responsibility for the harms of ra-
cial inequality and no remedy for centuries of systemic harms.  The unstat-
ed minor premises in these opinions are that segregation is natural, that ra-
cial inequality is ordinary, and that the status quo should not be upset by 
social engineering.264  The three appeals cases, however, represented then-
progressive views.  When those cases are read together, one might expect 
the next half-century or so would have seen an egalitarian society with truly 
integrated schools and housing.  As shown above, the outcome has uniform-
ly been otherwise.  
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The continued disparities and resegregation are due, in part, to the 
ubiquity of the majoritarian narratives and the limited voice given to coun-
ter-narratives even when the court’s holding is favorable.  The “right” hold-
ings were not enough; the majoritarian narratives continued to dictate the 
long-term social outcomes.  
For the decisions of tomorrow to effectuate lasting change, courts must 
critically examine a past that advocated “equality for all” but failed to fully 
include the voices and stories represented in counter-narratives.  Such ex-
amination will rarely be popular, but it is unequivocally necessary—
because the hope for enduring social change rests, in part, on court opinions 
where majoritarian enthymemes are articulated and dismissed, where social 
and historical context to discrimination is stated, and where previously un-
told stories are instead given amplification. 
